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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 20-3404  
______________ 
 





ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A043-660-315) 
Immigration Judge: Matthew Watters 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 23, 2021 
______________ 
 
Before: JORDAN, PORTER, and RENDELL, 
Circuit Judges. 
 













PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
Lisbell Patino-Madge is a native and citizen of Peru and a lawful permanent 
resident of the United States. In 2012, she was convicted of retail theft and conspiracy 
under Pennsylvania law, for which she received twelve months’ probation. In 2017, 
Patino-Madge was convicted of simple assault under Pennsylvania law, for which she 
received four to twelve months’ imprisonment. Based on the assault conviction, the 
Department of Homeland Security charged her with removability for having been 
convicted of (1) two or more crimes involving moral turpitude and (2) an aggravated 
felony. The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) sustained the charges, and Patino-Madge appealed 
the decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The BIA dismissed the 
appeal, ruling that Patino-Madge was properly found removable for having been 
convicted of an aggravated felony. Patino-Madge timely petitioned this Court for review 
of the BIA’s decision. We will deny the petition. 
I 
We have jurisdiction over this petition for review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). The IJ 
held that Patino-Madge’s assault conviction is both an aggravated felony and a crime 
involving moral turpitude, but the BIA affirmed only on the basis that the assault 
conviction is an aggravated felony. “Where the BIA affirms and partially reiterates the 
IJ’s discussions and determinations, we look to both decisions. If the Board relies only 
on some of the grounds given for denying relief, we review only these grounds.” Myrie v. 
Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 515 (3d Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). Our review is thus 





legal question that we review de novo. See Restrepo v. Att’y Gen., 617 F.3d 787, 790 (3d 
Cir. 2010). We write for the parties, who are familiar with the record. 
II 
“Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is 
deportable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Congress defined “aggravated felony” with a 
list of offenses. See id. § 1101(a)(43). The list includes “crime[s] of violence” for which 
the term of imprisonment is at least one year. Id. § 1101(a)(43)(F). A “crime of violence” 
is in turn defined as “an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 16(a). Patino-Madge was sentenced to four to twelve months’ imprisonment for her 
simple-assault conviction under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2701(a)(3). See Bovkun v. Ashcroft, 
283 F.3d 166, 170–71 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that we must “determine what is the term of 
imprisonment actually imposed” and concluding that “a sentence with both a minimum 
and a maximum term is treated comparably with a functionally equivalent sentence with 
only a maximum term”). To resolve this case, then, we need only decide whether simple 
assault under section 2701(a)(3) “has as an element the . . . threatened use of physical 
force against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). 
We have already answered that question. In Singh v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 533 (3d 
Cir. 2006), we held that “simple assault as defined by 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2701(a)(3) requires specific intent to use, threaten to use, or attempt to use force 
against an individual, and is therefore a crime of violence within 18 U.S.C. § 16(a).” 





§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) as an aggravated felon” and denied the petition for review. Id. at 
542. Patino-Madge argues that Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010), abrogated 
our decision, so we “should now reverse [our] prior holding from Singh.” Pet’r Br. 11. 
We disagree. Singh is still good law, and nothing in Johnson is to the contrary. 
In Johnson, the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of “physical force” in 18 
U.S.C. § 924. The Court reasoned that, “in the context of a statutory definition of ‘violent 
felony,’ the phrase ‘physical force’ means violent force.” Johnson, 559 U.S. at 140 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)). Johnson did not concern § 16(a), the provision at 
issue here. But the Court noted that § 924 and § 16 contain “very similar” provisions, and 
it looked to cases interpreting § 16 to guide its interpretation of § 924. Id. Specifically, 
the Court applied Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004), which employed similar 
contextual reasoning: in interpreting “physical force” in § 16(a), “we cannot forget that 
we ultimately are determining the meaning of the term ‘crime of violence.’” Id. at 11 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)); see also Johnson, 559 U.S. at 140. In both cases, the Court 
reasoned that the meaning of “physical force” was informed by the context of what it 
defined: a violent crime. Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11; Johnson, 559 U.S. at 140. The defendant 
in Johnson had been convicted of battery in Florida. Johnson, 559 U.S. at 136. The 
physical element of battery under Florida law could be satisfied by any intentional 
contact, however minimal. Id. at 138. Because battery under Florida law did not require 
violent force, it fell short of the federal statutory definition of a “violent felony.” 18 





Singh and Johnson are compatible. In Pennsylvania, a person is guilty of simple 
assault if she “attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious 
bodily injury.” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2701(a)(3). In Singh, we interpreted “physical 
menace” as requiring “some physical act by the perpetrator intended to cause ‘fear of 
imminent serious bodily injury’ in the victim.” Singh, 432 F.3d at 539 (quoting 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 2701(a)(3)). Violent force is “force capable of causing physical pain or 
injury to another person.” Johnson, 559 U.S. at 140. A threat of “imminent serious 
bodily injury” is, therefore, a threat of violent physical force. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 2701(a)(3); see Singh, 432 F.3d at 540. Simple assault under § 2701(a)(3) requires a 
threat of violent force, so Singh’s analysis is consistent with Johnson. 
Patino-Madge argues that Johnson’s violent-force requirement applies to the 
physical-act element of simple assault. She suggests that assault could be a crime of 
violence only if it required a violent physical act threatening violent physical force. But 
neither § 16(a) nor Johnson imposes such a requirement. Rather, a physical act that 
threatens violent force is itself a “threatened use of [violent] physical force.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 16(a); see Johnson, 559 U.S. at 140. As we said in Singh, it is “meaningless” to 
distinguish between “physical acts committed to threaten another with corporeal harm” 
and the concept of the “‘threatened use of physical force’ employed by § 16(a).” Singh, 
432 F.3d at 539–40.  
Simple assault under Pennsylvania law is thus a crime of violence, as we have 
already held. Id. at 540. No subsequent case or statute requires us to overturn Singh. 





an aggravated felony and a removable offense. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
* * * 
We will deny the petition for review. 
